Herramientas para el control de la empresa por parte del accionista: los códigos de buen gobierno e internet

María del Mar Alonso Almeida

doi:10.18002/pec.v0i6.698

Autores

María del Mar Alonso Almeida Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18002/pec.v0i6.698

Palavras-chave:

Códigos de buen gobierno, Internet, Control, Accionistas, Gobierno corporativo electrónico, Codes of good governance, Shareholders, Electronic corporate governance

Resumo

La globalización de la economia y los escándalos financieros en algunas empresas han hecho que la información sobre el funcionamiento y gobierno de las empresas sea un asunto critico para la confianza en éstas y para el buen funcionamiento del mercado de capitales.La información sobre las empresas, no sólo reduce los riesgos sobre las inversiones, sino que reduce las asimetrías de información e incrementa la transparencia de la empresa frente a accionistas e inversores.Los códigos de buen gobierno y la legislación emanada de estos códigos han impuesto grandes requerimientos de información a las empresas frente a los accionistas, principalmente sobre los órganos y prácticas de gobierno de las empresas, actuando de esta forma como sistemas de control del problema de agencia que desarrollan la transparencia, vigilan el valor de la empresa y reducen los costes de agencia. En este trabajo se va a analizar si los códigos de buen gobierno han contribuido a velar por los intereses de los accionistas; cómo lo están haciendo y proponer un modelo de desarrollo de gobierno electrónico que permita la verificación de las recomendaciones de buen gobierno y la participación en la vida social a los accionistas.

The globalization of the economy and the financial scandals at some companies have made the information on the performance and corporate governance are a critical issues for the trust in them and for the proper functioning of the capital market.The information on enterprises, not only reduces the risk on investments, but it reduces the information asymmetries and increases the transparency of the company for shareholders and investors.The codes of good governance and legislation emanating from these codes have imposed reporting requirements on large companies versus shareholders, primarily on organs and practices of corporate governance, thus acting as control systems to the problem of agency developing transparency, monitoring the value of the business and reduce the cost of agency.This paper will analyze whether the codes of good governance have contributed to look after the interests of shareholders, as we are doing and propose a model for development of e-government to permit verification of the recommendations of good governance and participation in social life to shareholders

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